Hierarchical identity-based signature （HIBS） has wide applications in the large network. However,the existing works cannot solve the trade-off between the security and efficiency. The main challenge at present is to construct a high efficient and strong secure HIBS with a low computation cost. In this paper,a new construction of HIBS scheme is proposed. The new scheme achieves the adaptive security which is a strong security in the identity-based cryptography. But our scheme has short public parameters and the private keys size shrinks as the hierarchy depth increases. The signature size is a constant and the cost of verification only requires four bilinear pairings,which are independent of hierarchy depth. Furthermore,under the q-strong computational diffie-Hellman problem （q-SDH） assumption,the scheme is provably secure against existential forgery for adaptive chosen message and identity attack in the standard model.
Power analysis has been a powerful and thoroughly studied threat for implementations of block ciphers and public key algorithms but not yet for stream ciphers. Based on the consumed power differences between two neighboring clock cycles, this paper presents a correlation power analysis （CPA） attack on the synchronous stream cipher DECIM^v2 （the tweaked version of the original submission DECIM）. This attack resynchronizes the cryptographic device ceaselessly with many different initialization values （IVs） to obtain enough power traces. Then by modeling the statistical properties of the differential power traces with the correlation coefficients, the proposed attack algorithm can completely reveal the secret key of DECIM^v2. Furthermore, a simulation attack is mounted to confirm the validity of the algorithm. The results show that the entire secret key of DECIM^v2 can be restored within several minutes by performing 12 CPA attacks. It seems that there are still some defects in the design of DECIM^v2 and thus some further improvements should be made to resist the proposed attack.
This paper describes two identity-based broadcast encryption （IBBE） schemes for mobile ad hoc networks. The first scheme proposed achieves sub-linear size cipertexts and the second scheme achieves O（1）- size ciphertexts. Furthermore, when the public keys are transmitted, the two schemes have short transmissions and achieve O（1） user storage cost, which are important for a mobile ad hoc network. Finally, the proposed schemes are provable security under the decision generalized bilinear Diffi-Hellman （GBDH） assumption in the random oracles model.
Four kinds of sequences generated by single cycle triangular function （T-function） are investigated to check the possibility for a single cycle T-function to be a cryptographic component in stream ciphers. Based on the special properties of single cycle T-function and an algorithm due to Wei, linear complexities of these four kinds of sequence are all acquired. The results show that single cycle T-function sequences have high linear complexity. Therefore, T-function satisfies the essential requirements being a basic component of stream cipher.
We propose a new biometric identity based encryption scheme （Bio-IBE）, in which user biometric information is used to generate the public key with a fuzzy extractor. This is the first Bio-IBE scheme that achieves constant size ciphertext. This is also a scheme that is secure against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack （CCA2）. Details are presented along with a discussion of Shamir＇s threshold secret sharing and fuzzy extraction of biometrics, which is based on error correction codes. We also define a security model and prove that the security of the proposed scheme is reduced to the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman proposed scheme has better efficiency and stronger security （DBDH） assumption. The comparison shows that the compared with the available Bio-IBE schemes.
Patarin proposed the dragon scheme, pointed out the insecurity of the dragon algorithm with one hidden monomial and suggested a candidate dragon signature algorithm with a complicated function. This paper presents an algebraic method to attack the candidate dragon signature algorithm. The attack borrows the basic idea of the attack due to Kipnis and Shamir, and utilizes the underlying algebraic structure of the candidate dragon signature algorithm over the extension field to derive a way to enable the variable Y be viewed as a fixed value. The attack recovers the private keys efficiently when the parameters are n≤2s and D=[logq^d]≤3.
